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ABSTRACT
Electronic Payment Systems that deal with daily shopping and payment over the
Internet are one of the most important concerns of today's electronic commerce.
There is a large body of research in this field, and in particular, on electronic cash
(e-cash) systems. In e-cash systems, protecting customer's privacy has received
much attention and many challenging problems relating to the trade-off between
multi-party security and system efficiency are proposed.
This thesis gives a brief survey of e-cash systems. We investigate various
problems raised in building secure and efficient e-cash systems. This includes
efficient off-line e-cash, perfect anonymity, revocable anonymity, combining the
advantages of on-line and off-line approaches and wallet loss recovery.
We will have a wide approach to the study of e-cash, which includes traditional
cryptographic approaches and approaches inspired by distributed computation and
processing. Our principal idea is to extend traditional e-cash models to allow
distributed processing and storage, and to combine the efficiency of off-line ecash with the security (against double-spending) of on-line e-cash. To realize
these ideas we introduce new notions:

(1) mirror wallets to support various desirable e-cash properties such as
revocable anonymity and wallet loss recovery.
(2) auditing servers to audit the customers' transactions.
(3) a dual-named server, the so-called ACS {Anonymous Communication Server
and Anti-Cheating Server), to provide anonymous communication and
restrain cheating and crime.
This results in a new proposal for e-cash, which allows various trade-offs between
security and efficiency. The proposal is efficient and versatile and yet succeeds to
control the potential risk of trust abuse where an insider in the trusted third party
{auditing server) is corrupted.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

INTRODUCTION

TO ELECTRONIC

CASH

Over the last decade business organizations have increasingly automated and
computerized their activities. With the rapid growth of the financial networks and the
Internet, electronic financial transactions have become increasingly common place.
Electronic Payments Systems (e-payment systems) dealing with daily shopping and
payment over the Internet are one of the most important concerns of today's
electronic commerce.
The efforts to build e-payment systems can be divided into two general approaches:
account-based systems and token-based systems. Account-based systems such as
credit card based systems have been dominating the market since early days of
electronic payment as the idea has been attractive to the customers and credit card
companies. In these systems, payment security can be achieved without technical
difficulty and possible abuses are largely eliminated. However the customers must
ignore the privacy they deserve: the financial institutions can easily build customers'
I-l

transaction profiles and direct their marketing policy. Moreover, if these profilers are
leaked, adversaries and competitive parties might misuse them and hence cause
unpredictable harm to the customers' business.

Later, electronic cash, the main token-based model, was introduced with the novel
idea of simulating the untraceable flow of the real cash in society. A digital token
bound to a certain money value can be produced by a bank and be withdrawn by a
customer as replacement for real cash. The token can be electronically spent at a shop
without leaking any information about the customer's identity. The property of
preserving customer's anonymity can be achieved just like using real cash. Although
e-cash approach has some implementation difficulty, as it does not rely on any
existing industrial infrastructure (while credit card - based approaches does) and
sometime satisfying the required conditions is not easy, e-cash approach deserves a
broad and deep treatment because of the very important properties it promises.

Despite these problems, e-cash approach is becoming more mature. This can be easily
seen by having widely available systems such as DigiCash's e-cash system (More
information can be referred to [DigiCash]).
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The background
Cryptographic techniques are always important tools in building e-payment systems,
especially e-cash systems. Throughout the last ten years, this area has received an
wide interest from many cryptographers. E-cash is a very good meeting place for
ambitious and imaginative thinking to combine the theoretic cryptography with the
practice of electronic commerce. Motivations can come from different practical
scenarios and can result in new notions and techniques, enriching both the two
fields^
This effort from the cryptographic community has brought about many e-cash
proposals with new properties (that one could not enjoy in other systems such as
credit card-based): customer anonymity, off-line payment, coin divisibility (in that
coins are multi-spendable).
However, ambitious goals result in very complex cryptographic protocols which are
very difficult to assess and examine. Many attacks have been considered against these
schemes which in turn have given birth to revisions and other new schemes, which
again have been attacked and modified, making e-cash an active area in the field of
applied cryptography. These all cause e-cash an interesting but difficultfieldof study.
^ Chapter 2 - 'Preliminaries'— will provide a brief survey on e-cash literature.
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Thesis aim statement
This thesis aims at examining Electronic Cash in the background of applied
cryptography and distributed processing. We consider various approaches in
constructing e-cash schemes, pointing out the main problems and propose
improvements.

We study the technical aspects of e-cash schemes and are not concerned with policy
aspects related to development and growth of e-cash systems in practice.

12 BASIC E-CASH MODEL
We first show the basic e-cash model, which will support us to present the main
problems investigated in the thesis and the research methodology taken to tackle
them. Firstly we describe the traditional model, and then we provide our proposed
system aimed at distributed processing.

In an abstract level, a basic e-cash system is a set of protocols between three main
parties:
+ The user (customer, payer, prover, Alice)
+ The shop (merchant, payee, verifier, service provider. Bob)
+ The issuer bank

1-4

Other possible parties are the judge and the certification authority.
There are three main procedures accomplished between these parties:
• Withdrawal protocol: Alice identifies herself to the bank and asks to withdraw
money. The bank gives her some e-coins and debits the equivalent amount from
her account.
• Payment protocol: Alice pays Bob by e-coins. Bob check the validity of these ecoins by verifying the bank's signature on them.
• Deposit protocol: Bob deposits the e-coins to the bank. The bank verifies and
updates Bob's account.
Other possible procedures may be:
• Opening customer's account: the bank creates an account for Alice and sets up
parameters for later use.
• Check of double-spending: the bank checks if the e-coins have been spent before.
The e-coins are just strings of bits and so can be easily duplicated and hence cheaters'
double-spending is possible. In on-line systems, the bank takes the check for doublespending in real-time as the shop contacts and deposits e-coins at the time of
payment. This can be done as the bank maintains a database of all the e-coins spent in
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the past. Therefore, the bank is able to make the shop accept or cancel the purchase,
but with an excessive communication and computation cost in real-time.

In off-line systems, the shop deposits e-coins at off-peak time (probably at the end of
day or the end of week) and double-spending can only be detected after the event.
Complex cryptographic means are required to detect the double-spender while
preserving the anonymity of the honest customers.
-e-coins—•
Customer

PP

Shop

Bank

Figure 1. Basic E-cash model

1-6

Electronic cash system can also be seen as a distributed system with three processing
node - the customer (C), the bank (IB) and the shop (S). There are three pairwise
interactive processes - withdrawal ( Pw), payment ( PP) and deposit (PD)- between
the pairs fC,B), fC,S) and (B,S), respectively. The bank has the central role in the
system and maintains 2 databases:
+ A list of reports as views of withdrawals (Lw)
+ A list of reports as views of deposits ( LD).
LW is updated during PW and LD is updated during PD .
In anonymous e-cash^, items in Lw are different and unlinkable to the ones in LD; this
is due to the blinding process^ in Pw.
In on-line e-cash, PP and PD are simultaneous, while in off-line e-cash, they are
separate.
^ This name is used to separate the considered systems from some other unimportant
systems, which are also claimed as of e-cash approach in spite of not providing
anonymity. They are actually account-based and are not considered in this thesis.
The process occurs in a blinding digital signature, where a message has been
masked before giving to the signer who is still able to sign on without seeing the real
message. Blind signature schemes will be discussed in the next chapter
'Preliminaries'.
1-7

Thus, e-cash model is a protocol among three or more parties, skillfully designed to
prevent the bank from linking and tracing the customer's payments, even if the
merchant colludes with the bank.

The following diagram illustrates the correspondence that maybe found between
traditional and electronic shopping systems.

Traditional

Computerized

Customers, banks, shops

Computers, smart cards

Payment methods

->

Communication means

->

Cryptographic protocols
Computer networks

(usually, face-to-face)
Cash

^

Electronic coin

Wallet

Electronic wallet

Credentials (certificates, licenses.

Database Wallet

records ...)

Figure 2. Electronic Cash: Automation of daily shopping by cash
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1.3 RESEARCH

METHOD

It is hard to say that I started studying the field with a ready and clear research
methodology in mind. Actually the topic has been absorbed gradually through all the
different stages. Below I will present the main steps that I have followed through the
whole work.
1.3.1 ACHIEVING THE FUNDAMENTALS

Given that the literature on e-cash was large with there were many proposals with
sophisticated strong cryptographic techniques, I tried to gradually understand the
basics of the most important schemes. Following this I produced a draft classification
of the proposed schemes based on their properties and ftinctionalities and the
approaches they had followed. To understand an approach, I made a 'history' report
of the approach, listing and studying all the important results from the beginning to
the most up to date one. This helped me to clearly understand the development of
each approach, the aims of the approach and the cryptographic tools used or devised
for that'.

^ Some results were really difficult to understand. Without this proper strategy, given
that my background of the first degree did not relate to cryptography, it would be
unable for me to reach to 'the state of art' knowledge in this field.
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1.3.2 ACHIEVING A FRAMEWORK

After obtaining a thorough knowledge in this field, I was able to construct a
framework in which the notions and techniques in e-cash systems were classified.
From this, it was possible to see what the problems in earlier e-cash systems had
been, and how they were solved later. Also which schemes were considered good at
that time. This helped to point out the deficiencies and the shortcomings that still
existed to that date and suggested where I could extend the systems and introduce
new construction..
1.3.3 MY OWN TREATMENT: A NEW APPROACH IN MODEUNG

During the initial survey period I noted that most e-cash proposals were devised by
cryptographers and mathematicians and were quite abstract and high level. However
I could not find much work on distributed methods, which looked very promising and
required much more development.
Here I noted that, if one put more participants into the basic model and distribute the
functions and the workload, then the workload of each participant will be reduced
and new useful functions can be implemented.

I-IO

Following this came the idea of extending the basic model and reorganizing the
system functions. I used the distributed processing approach and from that, three
initial considerations were made and later refined:

(1) Prior restraint by third-party servers. I noticed that in on-line e-cash systems,
the 'shield' to protect against double-spending (prior restraint rather than detection
after the fact) was in the bank's module, while in 'wallet with observer' e-cash^, it
was in the customer's module. I then proposed a 'shield' to be deployed by using
another party different from C, B and S. This party would play a role independent
from the bank's and the customer's, giving no favor to any other party. This middle
party could also help to protect against attacks from criminals and provide a desirable
trade-off between the most important three aspects of e-cash: security for the bank,
privacy for the customer and law enforcement when customer anonymity is abused.

(2) Distribution of processing. Secondly, I found that there were two extremes in ecash: on-line payment and off-line payment. On-line payment systems were preferred
because they could effectively stop double-spending. On-line payment systems are a
'must' for high value purchases. However, on-line payment creates a bottleneck in
the bank which becomes more critical when LD grows in size. Adding other

This concept will be discussed in detail in chapter 2 'Preliminaries'
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processing servers between the bank server and the shop computers could help to
absorb the overhead that the bank host had used to handle alone. Moreover, the
range between a fully on-line and a fully off-line payment could be filled in by
distributing and varying the processing in the network of intermediate servers in the
coin-checking process.
(3) Distribution of storage. To reduce the computation-load in checking doublespending at the deposit time, I proposed to distribute LD into sub-lists maintained by
different servers. Using this approach, the computation load at the bank could be
reduced by a factor determined by the number of LD sub-lists.

L3.4 A NEW SYSTEM

The above directions were followed to develop a new system with new properties.
First a high level model was set up, defining participating parties and their general
functionalities. In the second phase, many step-by-step refinements were used to
obtain a detailed design that could be implemented.
In this refinement phase, the flow of information between different parties were
analyzed, and to achieve the goals, new notions were introduced. A thorough
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understanding of e-cash systems allowed me to learn many cryptographic tools that I
later used to build my own system.

Finally, I had to learn how to analyze the security of a systems under all possible
attacks and employ this skill to the new proposed system achieved.

In summary, my research strategy was as follows:
'studying the proposed systems^ development of a basic model
main approaches ^ a

framework

analyzing the

analyzing deficiencies and shortcomings

new

model ^ refinement ^ designing a new systems'^.

L4

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS WITH A BRIEF STATEMENT OF

THE MAIN RESULTS

The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction. Chapter 2
provides preliminaries on applied cryptography for the field of e-cash. Chapters 3, 4
and 5 present the main body of this thesis - our main results is a new e-cash scheme.
Chapter 6 reviews all the investigated and the findings.

Or, this can be simply said 'analysis - modeling - refinement - achieving new systems'
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In the following we briefly introduce the main results which will be discussed in depth
in chapters 3,4 and 5.

An e-cash framework with a ^near-line^ checking
In chapter 3 we have proposed intermediate servers to setup a 'near-lino.' checking:
these servers are always available to shops in a small neighborhood and are to be
contacted at the payment time, or with varying delay period, depending on the
purchase value. This helps to setup a 'near prior-restraint 'against double-spending.
Also, it helps to distribute and moderate the checking process. This results in a
framework to extend existing systems to achieve a continuum between on-line and
off-line payment.

E-cash schemes with distributed storage and processing
The following will discuss a novel idea used in this thesis. Multiple (N) servers for
processing deposits are used (deposit server). Each customer is bound to one
particular deposit server. This can be done by encoding the name of that server into
each coin minted at the withdrawal phase by that customer, using some special tools.
This means that the deposit transactions from a particular customer are always
processed by a fixed deposit server to check the LD sub-list maintained by that server.
Clearly, communication, computation and storage required in each deposit server is

1-14

an order of N less than that required in the bank host computer in the traditional online e-cash system.

We develop further the above idea in chapter 4&5 where customers are not only
bound to fixed deposit servers but also their submitted coins (after deposit) are stored
in separate storage compartments of each deposit server, called 'mirror

wallets'\

This provides further saving in computation time (by the factor that is to be
determined by the number of customers per each deposit server).

Moreover, we propose an auditing functionality for the deposit server that makes it
the 'auditing server'^, which has an independent role having no favor to either the
bank or the customer. We present the basic scheme with one auditing server in
chapter 4.

Finally, we propose an architecture with multiple auditing servers which anonymously
communicates to outside world (banks, customers, shops) and thus, we have the final
and the most effective scheme in chapter 5.

^, ^ These notions will be discussed in depth in the chapter 4 when the context is fiilly described
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The following figure will illustrate the stages of the development of the 'distributed
system' idea.

PJ

Customer

Shop
e-com

B/

Bank

Deposit servers

Customer

C/ Customer

o o o o

Shop

e-coin

Anonymous auditing servers

O

Shop

irror
wallet

Figure 3. A) The traditional e-cash model. B) The extension with multiple
deposit servers. C) The extension with multiple anonymous auditing servers.
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II. PRELIMINARIES

Existing digital payment systems are often designed with a high priority for the
security of the financial institutions and thus there is not much to guarantee that the
customers' trust is not abused. The customer must trust the system that is employed
by the bank and there is no way to ensure that the system will not be attacked by a
dishonest insider in the bank. In the case of dispute, no party has any legal base to
prove itself and disclose the fraud of the other party. Electronic cash is the only
realm, in which this issue is addressed and the customers' rights of privacy is
protected.

Recently, there has been a large body of research in this field and so an attempt to
review the field in depth would require a great effort that is probably out of the scope
of this thesis^. Here we shall try to address the most major issues and problems and

^ A review like that can be seen in [Tsi97]
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briefly discuss the main underlying techniques, giving a technical background for the
presentation of our results in the next chapters.
Firstly, we present a brief survey on the most important system properties in e-cash.
//. 1 A BRIEF SURVEY ON E-CASH DESIRABLE PROPERTIES

"Universal Electronic Cash" by Okamoto and Ohta ([OkOh91]) is the first attempt at
defining an ideal electronic cash system. In this work, six most desirable properties
are identified. They are: physical independence, security, protecting privacy, off-line
payment, transferability and divisibility.
11. /. 1 PHYSICAL INDEPENDENCE

Unlike real cash, the security of e-cash does not rely on the physical means. The ecoins are digital numbers and can be easily transferred through the world wide
networks.
IL1.2 SECURITY

The ability to copy (reuse) and forge the e-cash must be prevented. Strong
cryptographic tools are needed in e-cash to protect against abuses.
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11.1.3 PRIVACY PROTECTION

The privacy of customer must be protected. That is, the relationships between the
user and his purchases must be untraceable. This is the most important property of ecash systems that distinguishes them from other e-payment systems.
It should be noticed that real cash does not strictly obey 'the rule of untraceability' as
mentioned above. This is true because theoretically, real cash can be traced using
serial numbers on the notes. But this is rarely used in practice.
II. 1.3.1 Untraceability & unlinkability
There are two levels in protecting a customer's privacy in electronic cash:
untraceability {anonymity) and unlinkability. Untraceability means the inability of
the bank to link the customer to her purchases, even with the help of the shops.
Unlinkability is stricter: a purchase can not be linked to the customer who made it
and also can not be linked to the other purchases made by the same customer in the
past.
To understand that why unlinkability is necessary, let us consider an e-cash system
that provides untraceability but does not provide unlinkability. The bank here can not
link customers to their purchase transactions, however still the bank can create a
dossier recording all purchase transactions, with multiple 'pages' that each of them
11-19

stores transactions originated by the same customer. Then if accidentally, a
customer's identifier is revealed in a certain purchase, e.g. the shop-keeper knows the
customer, this dossier can be used to trace all the activities of this unfortunate
customer for years. This will not happen with the systems capable to support
unlinkability.
11.1.4 OFF-LINE PAYMENT

The deposit and then checking of double-spending is made after the payment instead
of on-line and during in the payment. This saves real-time communication and
computation cost.
ILl.4.1 On-line vs. Off-line
Most early e-cash systems are on-line systems. By using a central host which keeps
live communications with all the shops' computers, double-spending is prevented.
The shop contacts the bank in real-time and hence payment and deposit are both done
at the same time. This allows double-spending to be easily checked and prevented.
The main drawback of the on-line model is the overhead of live communication and
real-time computation at the bank host. When the system grows, the bank host
computer soon becomes a bottleneck, flooded with huge flow of transactions from
vast number of shops and customers.
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Figure 4, On-line e-cash model

Bank

Shop
deposit &checking
double-spending
(t=T+T')
payment
(t=T)

User
Figure 5. Off-line e-cash model
In off-line payment systems, the shop does not need to contact the bank in real-time
and double-spending can be checked later at off-peak time. Detection instead of
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prevention is used against double-spending. However off-line detection requires
complex cryptographic primitives and still suffers the risk of misuse by powerfiil and
malicious attackers. These drawbacks will be mentioned through out this thesis.
Today, most e-cash research focuses on off-line e-cash.
IL1.5

TRANSFERABILITY

The cash can be transferred, 'hand by hand', between customers, just like real cash.
This property is later argued not to be reaUy necessary, while introducing too much
complexity in the system. A valid electronic coin must be encoded with the
customer's identity to detect double-spending. On transferring this e-coin to another
person, there must be a reconstruction phase to re-encode the new owner's identity
into the e-coin. This actually results in another protocol which has a complexity equal
to the withdrawal protocol and requires the involvement of the bank to sign the new
coin ([Bra93a]).
IL1.6

DIVISIBILITY

An e-coin can be used many times in different purchases with different values, such
that the total of all the 'spent values' does not exceed the coin's 'whole value',
determined in the withdrawal. This property is very important as otherwise the
customer always need to keep a large number of e-coins of various values in order to
pay with the exact needed value.
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Real cash does not iiilly have this property as the changes that are refunded from the
shops, are not 'original parts' of the notes that the shop received from the customers,
and are usually many in quantity then.

Divisibility is first mentioned and implemented by Okamoto and Ohta ([OkOh89,
OkOh91]). They both use the binary tree approach in that an e-coin is constructed
with a tree structure that consists N levels of nodes, each of them having zero or two
offsprings. Each node bears a value so that is equal to the sum of the values on its
direct two offsprings. The customer can gradually spend the coin 'bit-by-bit' by cut&-pay nodes from this tree. If the value of a node at level N (the leaves) is 1 cent
then the customer can always pay exact amounts in cents by this tree-structured ecoin.

However the proposed schemes are impractical as they both rely on the cut-andchoose method and require too much storage and computation. Later, Okamoto
constructed a much more efficient divisible e-cash ([Oka95]) that still uses binary
approach but is based on the Brands' single-term e-cash ([Bra93a], the most efficient
off-line e-cash designed so far).

Another approach to achieve divisibility is to employ the concept of account balance.
A coin can be spent many times, each time with a different value, and still remain
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spendable as long as the total paid value has not reached the total value assigned to
the coin at the withdrawal (or the balance/counter is still positive). However in this
case, the problem of how to prevent overspending (that replaces the notion of
double-spending in indivisible e-cash) becomes harder as it is much more difficult to
trace overspending.

SmartCash and Mondex are existing systems with this feature, however the security
of these systems depends on the security of the smart-card wallet and if the attacker
successfully breaks into the smart-card he can freely change the counter to make a
large profit. A better solution is the e-cash system with counter-based wallets
([Bra94]) based on the basic e-cash in [Bra93a].

Another solution for this approach is introduced by Jakobsson and Yung in [JaYu96].
A trusted party called 'ombudsman' takes part in the withdrawal will help the bank to
trace the overspenders. When it is required, the ombudsman will participate in
payment phase (then payment is on-line) to check and catch the overspenders.

IL2 PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE-SPENDING
Detection and prevention double-spending (or over-spending for divisible e-cash) is
the most important consideration in building off-line e-cash systems. There are three
main approaches:
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IL2.1

DETECTION AFTER THE FACT

A number of authors ([ChFN88, OkOh89, OkOh91, FrYu93, Bra93b, Fe94, Yac94,
etc.]) have proposed systems to detect the dishonest customer's ID from two deposit
views of the same coin, while the anonymity of the honest customers is maintained.
The main idea is to encode an e-coin with the identity of the customer who
withdraws the coin. The coin consists of two secret components so that:
+ the coin can be seen as a line detennined by 2 points - 2 secret components - on it.
+ during the payment, a secret component {a point on the line) is revealed and if the
customer double-spends, these two revealed 'points' will help to determine the
customer's identity encoded into the coin.
This idea can be extended to build e-cash with k-spendable coins. The system will use
the fact that a (A:+l)-dimensional hyperplane can not be determined with k known
points on it but is completely determined by k+1 different known points (of course,
with the condition that these points do not lie in a A:-dimensional hyperplane). These
k-spendable coins have been constructed in [Bra93a] to extend the Brands' basic ecash with divisibility.
However encoding e-coins with the customers' identity was never easy and, it took a
long time for research on off-line e-cash to build practical off-line e-cash systems
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(from 1988 with the first off-line scheme in [ChFN88] to 1993 with efficient schemes
in [Bra93a, Fe94]).

11.2.1.1 Cut-and-choose based e-cash
Early off-line e-cash schemes ([ChFN88, OkOh89, OkOh91, FrYu93, etc.]) rely on
the cut-and-choose method of Zero-Knowledge proofs. This is later criticized as
being inefficient. To withdraw an e-coin, the customer constructs and presents to the
shop 2n "terms", each of which encoding customer's identity and consisting of 2
inner components {n is the security parameter).

The bank randomly "cuts and

chooses" n "terms" and the customer discloses the structure of these n "terms" to
show that indeed they are honestly constructed. Then the bank signs (using blind
signature) the remaining n "terms" and returns them to the customer. In payment
phase, a similar cut-and-choose mechanism is employed such that the shop by a
challenge-response process can have lof the 2 ( by random choice) inner components
of each of the n terms. Then if the customer dishonestly spends a coin twice, with
overwhelming probability there exist a term, of which 2 different components are
revealed to the shop, which when combined will reveal the full identity of the
customer.

11.2.1.2 Single-term off-line e-casli
Cut-and-choose based e-cash is inefficient as communication, computation and
storage requirements are multiplied by a factor of n. Single-term e-cash schemes are
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[ChPe92, Bra93a&b, Fe94] introduced to get rid off of using cut-and-choose method
in encoding customer's ID into the e-coins. Single-term means that only one term is
used to represent the e-coin instead of n terms used in cut-and-choose based systems.
Clearly, compared to cut-and-choose based e-cash, the efficiency of single-term ecash is multiplied by a factor of n.

Single-term schemes are typically based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)
with the most efficient scheme to date, due to Brands' ([Bra93a,b]). Brands' scheme
relies on the presentation problem, which is a generalization of DLP. Brands' basic ecash based on presentation problem has been used by different authors to construct
different extensions. This includes:

+ incorporating with the model of 'wallet with observer' ([Bra93a,b]).
+ building an efficient divisible e-cash ([Oka95]).
+ building an efficient anonymity revocable e-cash ([FrTY96]).

A cryptographic primitive that Brands invented, and had all his construction based on
it, is the so called 'restrictive blind signature'. We will say more on this primitive in
section II.4.
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II.2.1.3 Pseudonym-based e-cash
In some e-cash schemes ([0092, Oka95, CPS96, FTY96]) a pseudonym which is not
traceable to the customer's identity, is produced during the account setup phase. In
[Yac94, Mao96], each customer has a public-key certificate that is shown to the shop
to verify the coin. The customer's identifier embedded into the customer's secret key,
will be revealed if the customer double-spends the same coin. Using pseudonym or
public key certificate results in a simpler mechanism for detection and improves
system efficiency. However e-coins are linkable as the bank knows that they
originate from the same pseudonym, which is less desirable compared to unlinkable ecoin schemes.

IL2.1.4 Probabilistic random auditing
Recently, some authors ([JaOd97, Yac97]) have considered the mechanism of
random auditing based on probabilistic polling: during the payment, with some small
probability the shop forwards the payment transaction report to the bank to audit the
customer's spending status ([JaOd971). This probability parameter can be varied in
accordance with the value of payment. This helps to create a hybrid system from the
two traditional models - on-line and off-line payment - that takes advantages of both
these models.
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11.2.2 'WALLET WITH OBSERVER*

An innovative off-line model, the so-called 'wallet with observer', was introduced in
[ChPe92, CrRe93, Bra93a&b, CAFE94, Fe93]. The basic idea in this model is the
introduction of an observer inside the user's module (wallet). The observer, acting as
a representative of the issuer bank, observes all the information flow between the
wallet and other parties and records all spent coins. The user module needs the
cooperation of the observer in the processes of withdrawing new coins from the
bank, and in paying coins to the shop. Then if the observer discovers that the user
module is trying to reuse an already spent coin, it simply refuses to cooperate and
hence the cheating fails. Using this mechanism a prior restrain against doublespending can be introduced which seems to provide a level of security equivalent to
the on-line model.
In practice, the concept of using an observer inside the wallet is achieved by using
smart-cards with tamper-resistant module. Smart-cards are small hand-held
computational devices that can perform cryptographic operations. Here, e-wallet is
typically a smart-card with its own display and keyboard which is capable of storing
e-coins, and supports all payment functionalities. More information about smart-card
and its application to e-commerce can be found in [Dev92] and [GSTY96].
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Chaum ([Cha92]) introduced the novel idea of various digital pseudonym cards
which store a database of user credentials and can represent the user in various
activities.

E-cash systems can be used in both the environments of ordinary shopping and
shopping over the Internet. In the first case, the customer goes shopping with a
smart-card wallet. A payment transaction is commenced by connecting the smart-card
to the shop's computer to transfer e-coins for the payment. For the 'wallet with
observer' model, the wallet consists of two modules: user module and observer
module - a tamper-resistant device. In the latter case of shopping over the Internet,
the user module is the user's PC and the observer module is an PCMCIA card
([Bra95]).
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Figure 6, 'Wallet with Observer' e-cash model

II.2.2.1 Incorporating 'detection after the fact' with 'wallet with observer'
Brands [Bra93a,b] even built a scheme which was able to combine both the above
mentioned mechanisms, namely 'detection after the facf and 'prior restrain by inside
observer'. The 'detection after the facf mechanism acts as a backup solution if the
observer is broken. This incorporation is used in CAFE (Conditional Access For
Europe), a European project for an electronic wallet solution, supposed to be used
throughout the Europe [CAFE94].
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11.2,3 EMPLOYING TRUSTED THIRD-PARTY

Recently, there are some proposals [JaYu96, M'Ra96] that employ a trusted thirdparty in the withdrawal and sometimes in the payment, to protect against doublespending and, at the same time, provide a solution to revocable anonymity (that will
be mentioned in the next section). The trusted party, the so called ombudsman in
[JaYu96] (or the so called blinding office in [M'Ra96]), cooperates with the bank in
the withdrawal such that:
+ Customers and transactions are anonymous w.r.t. (with respect to) the bank or the
ombudsman.
+ The blinding process is between the ombudsman and the bank. The coin obtained
by customer is blind w.r.t. the bank but not to the ombudsman. When the bank
cooperates with the ombudsman, double-spending and potential crimes such as
blackmailing, money laundering can be effectively disclosed and stopped.
In this thesis we will present two proposals that also employ trusted third-parties. In
the first one, we introduce the notion of Anti-Cheating Servers (ACS), which acts
like a 'consultant' to the shops to prevent against double-spenders. However, the
balance between on-line and off-line consulting is such that the lower value coins are
checked 'more' off-line with longer delay.
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Our second proposal is based on the notion of the auditing server that works
somehow like the ombudsman in [JaYu96] but does not involves directly in the
withdrawal (on-line) and hence is more efficient.

IL3 REVOCABLE ANONYMITY
In previous anonymous e-cash systems there is no way to link a coin to its owner as
long as the owner has not double-spent the coin. Recently, some authors ([vSN92,
CMS96a, CPS96, FrTY96, JaYu96]) have pointed out that perfect anonymity offers
potential for committing perfect crimes such as blackmailing and money laundering.
For instance, a customer may be forced to withdraw e-coins to transfer to an
anonymous blackmailer. With perfect anonymity, there is no way to catch the
blackmailer if he does not double-spend. This property would deter electronic money
from being widely used and obtaining government support.

Anonymity control is the main goal of the recent works in electronic cash. Various
proposals ([CPS94, CMS96a, CPS96, FrTY96, JaYu96, M'Ra96, JaYu97b]) have
suggested revocable anonymity which is the possibility of tracing a customer or a
coin, given a court order, while honest customers still enjoy anonymity.

This is often achieved by using a trusted party (trustee). The customer's ID is
encrypted and embedded into the coin in such a way that the coin remains anonymous
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unless both the bank and the trustee collaborate: basically, each party keeps a share
of a secret knowledge, which when combined can provide a way of extracting the
owner's ID.
In addition to the set of traditional protocols (withdrawal, payment & deposit), two
more protocols are discussed in anonymity revocable e-cash:
+ Owner tracing protocol: This protocol is used to prevent money laundering or
illegal purchases as to trace the origin of suspicious coins. Typically, it is required to
trace the payer in an illegal purchase (drugs, etc.) if the seller is disclosed. The bank
gives the trustee the report it has received during the deposit of the coin. The trustee
then return some information that the bank can use to identify the coin's owner
against its client account database.
+ Coin tracing: This protocol is used to trace un-spent coins in case of blackmailing.
Typically, the victim of a blackmail alarms the authority after the threat has gone.
With the help of the victim, suspicious withdrawal transactions can be singled out
from the bank's withdrawal database. The trustee then uses this information to work
out the 'features' of the coins withdrawn due to this blackmailing, and informs the
shops to blacklist coins.
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In [JaYu96], another potential attack that takes advantage of perfect anonymity is
introduced - the so called bank robbery. In this attack, the attacker forces the bank to
hand out the secret key and produces invalid e-coins. This is an extremely strong
attack which is prevented in [JaYu96] by involving another trusted party, called the
'ombudsman', in the blinding process.
IIA

BUNDING

TECHNIQUES

The blinding process is the 'core' of minting electronic coins as it provides coins'
anonymity. An e-cash scheme without blinding process (such as NetCash, [MeNe93])
would hardly be anonymous.
Blind signature schemes were first introduced in [Ch83]. Today, there are many blind
signature schemes using different basic signature schemes (RSA, Schnorr, ElGammar, DSA, etc.).
IL4.1

A FORMAL DEFINITION OF BLIND SIGNATURE

A blind signature scheme consists of a 4-tuple of functions
{Bl{m, p), Sig(mX Unbl(m, p),Ve{m,m')).
The user blinds the message M with the blinding factor p
M' = Bl(M,p)
then sends M' to the signer who computes and returns the signed blinded message
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The user then un-blinds M" to obtain
M'" =

UnBl{M'\p).

M"' is the signed and un-blinded message and can be verified by

For short, the 4-tuple of functions must satisfy the following equation
VM, Vp

Ver(m,Unbl(Sig(Bl(M,p)),p))

= 1.

Example: A blind signature scheme.
The difficulty of computing cube root modulo N (without the knowledge of N's
factorization) is used in blind signature [ChFN88]. Alice, instead of giving the hash
value of the original message that is to be signed, gives the bank the product of the
hash value and a secret factor p (blinding factor):
In return she will get,
hixy^'xp
and easily divide it by p to get the required signature. That is, she will obtain the cube
root of
modulo N. However, the bank only knows the message
which is untraceable to h(x) as long as the bank does not know p.
IL4.2

BRANDS'

RESTRICTIVE BLIND

SIGNATURE

As mentioned earlier, the early off-line e-cash proposals suffered from the problem of
using inefficient cut-&-choose method to solve the problem of encoding an e-coin
with the owner's identity. In the Brands' e-cash based on the presentation problem
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([Bra93a&b]), an special blind signature scheme, the so called restrictive blind
signature, is invented to help to avoid using cut-&-choose method. That is: some
internal aspect of a message will not be changed during the blinding process whereas
it is still blinded to the bank. This suggests to encode the customer's identity into this
internal structure. This internal structure is based on the notion of the presentation
problem then may be called presentation structure. In payment the shop will
challenge the customer to obtain partial knowledge of the presentation structure. The
result is that this presentation structure wUl be revealed if the customer doublespends the coin and the double-spender will be caught as her identity was encoded
into this presentation structure at the withdrawal.
IL4.3

BUNDING BY TRUSTED THIRD PARTY

The above mentioned nice feature of Brand's restrictive blind signature causes the
efficiency for his e-cash scheme in [Bra93a&b], however it requires complex
constructions. Single-term off-line e-cash following this approach is, then, usually
difficult to understand. In [JaYu96, M'Ra96], another approach for blinding is
introduced. In these proposals, the customer 'borrows' a trusted third party (the
ombudsman in [JaYu961 or the blinding office in [M'Ra96]) to represent her in the
blinding process with the bank. Therefore the coins obtained by the customer later
are blinded to the bank but not to, say, the ombudsman, whereas the interactive
process between the three parties - customer, bank and ombudsman - is deployed
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such that the e-coins are anonymous to both the bank and the ombudsman. Hence,
overspending and criminals (blackmailing, money laundering, bank robbery) can be
traced if and only if both the bank and the ombudsman cooperate.

IL4.4

VERSATILITY

Versatility ([JaYu96]) is the property of a basic e-cash model that can easily be
extended to provide many desirable features: divisibility, e-cheque payment, creditcard payment, micro payment, surety bond, etc. The customer has the ability to
choose and agree with the shop on different options for a payment. For example:
+ Pay for an exact amount up to the total value of a coin.
+ Pay in the forms of cheque or credit card payment (the customer's identity then
needed to be revealed to debit the customer's account with the paid amount in the
deposit).
+ The coins obtained by the receiver can only be cashed if the sender does not follow
some certain condition (e.g. to pay rent in time).

These properties can be achieved through a mechanism called challenge semantics,
introduced in [JaYu96]. That is to encode certain different bits of a challenge sent by
the shop to the customer in the payment phase with some certain facts, conditions,
etc. The response of the customer to this meaningful challenge number can be seen
as a contract that both sides - customer and shop - agree on. The customer can not
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deny any violation which is traced by the authority (bank and ombudsman in
[JaYu96]).

Versatility and how to achieve it, as shown in [JaYu96], can be seen as a new
methodology which can be applied to various e-cash schemes. The e-cash scheme
that, in our opinion, can be extended to achieve versatility, are probably these that:
+ employ a trusted third-party in the withdrawal process to authorize the e-coins;
+ this trusted third-party works in a combined on-line and off-line manner to
cooperate with the bank to trace the customer when legally required.
The proposals in [JaYu96, M'Ra96] and our proposal presented in chapter IV satisfy
these properties.
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III. A FRAMEWORK FOR COMBINING OFF-LINE &
ON-LINE E- CASH^°

The two main categories of electronic cash systems are on-line and off-line systems,
each with its own advantages and drawbacks. In this chapter we propose a hybrid
system that combines the advantages of the on-line and off-line model and achieves a
high degree of security and flexibility. We describe the structure of the system and
examine the importance of its parameters in providing security.

This chapter is on realizing the ideas of 'near prior-restrainf
and ojf-line payment'

and 'continuum between

on-line

that have been mentioned in chapter 2. However we do not use these

terminology in this chapter and base the chapter on [NgSa97a]. This helps to keep the chapter as a
consistent and self-contained structure, and reflect the way it is naturally developed.
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IIL1

INTRODUCTION:

IN PREVIOUS E-CASH

HI. 1.1

A FRAMEWORK

TO OVERCOME

THE

DRAWBACKS

SYSTEMS

DRA WBACKS IN PREVIOUS E-CASH

MODELS

Firstly we discuss the drawbacks of the previous off-line e-cash models.

The drawback of Chaum model. The drawback of the e-cash model, that is firstly
introduced by Chaum ([ChFN88]), is that unlike the on-line model it does not offer a
prior restraint against double-spending. Although, the double-spender's identity can
be disclosed and the proper action can be taken afterwards, but the delay may allow
the malicious cheater to make vast number of purchases with the same coin that she
might have stolen from some other honest user. A malicious cheater can maximize
her profit using her knowledge of the time delays in the system. She might even
corrupt certain shops to have long delays for depositing coins to the bank so that the
cheater succeed in her double-spending attack.

From this discussion one can see that the 'detection after the fact' mechanism used in
this model is not effective. The honest users and the ones who do not have detailed
knowledge of the system will never try to double spend, while the malicious ones,
who have made a careftil plan to cheat, can avoid all traps to gain a fortune. In both
cases the 'detection after the fact' mechanism seems of no practical use.

III-41

The weaknesses of the ^Wallet with Observer' model.
1 .The future of 'wallet with observer' e-cash systems depends on the development in
the smart card technology. However, smart cards are not going to be perfectly
secure. Trusting tamper-resistant property of smart-cards has been considered
problematic and recent research ([AnKu96, BDL96]) is cautioning the community
not to carelessly trust the tamper-resistance of smart-cards. Recent news over the
Internet are signaling some severe flaws in the smart-card chip of well-known epayment systems like Master Card, VISA.

2. In shopping over the Internet, the use of an observer chip causes some
inconvenience, compared to an all software system. To install an e-cash system, in the
latter case, the user only needs to download some software from the Internet, while
in the former, he also need to acquire some special hardware.

3. Another disadvantage of employing observer modules is that the user might fear
that the observer chip acts as a spy for the manufacturer or the bank, and breaches
her privacy ([Fin94]). This may discourage the spread of the e-cash systems based on
'wallet with observer'.
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IIL1.2 OUR PROPOSAL

It is commonly admitted that an e-cash system that provides the three main features anonymity, off-line payment and robustness against double-spending - is not easy to
construct. Recently, 'wallet with observer' e-cash is proposed but as it has been
mentioned above, this model also has some weaknesses. Some approaches have
considered backup systems when the smart-card chip is broken. For example, the ecash system in [CAFE94] is based on the Brands' scheme of combining prior restrain
by observer and detection after the fact (see IL2.2).
Noting the nature and weaknesses of the on-line and off-line models we propose a
hybrid system in which some on-line features are added to the Chaum off-line model.
Our framework can be seen as an extension of the Chaum off-line model;
alternatively it can extend the 'wallet with observer" model. The new system
effectively removes the drawback of the Chaum off-line model and yet does not
suffer from the problem of overloading the bank host in the on-line model. The key
point is to look at the on-line and off-line systems as the two extremes of a
continuum and consider systems that are in between.
In the on-line model, the submitted coin is checked in the real-time against the
database of all the spent coins. However, in the Chaum off-line model, coins are
submitted to the bank, at an off-peak time. One can say that the delay in doubleIII-43

spending detection in the former case is zero while in the latter is one day. We
propose variable levels of delay for coins, with more valuable coins having less delays
and the smaller coins having more delays. For instance, the biggest coin would have
no delay (as in the on-line model) and the lowest value coin may have one day delay
(as in the Chaum off-line model).
IIL1.3

OFF-ON-LINE

Our hybrid model is obtained by inserting some degree of real-time (or on-line
degree) into the double-spending checking phase of the Chaum model. The key idea
is to vary the real-time degree in proportion to the coin value. This varying real-time
degree helps to optimize the system load: the probability of double-spending is not
absolutely removed as in the on-line model but is effectively reduced by making the
cost of the attack greater than the potential gain from it. The off-line detection after
the fact mechanism is still used as the security back-up: vandals or hostile parties who
ignore the attacking cost will eventually be disclosed through this mechanism.
From now on we use the term 'off-on-line' to refer to our proposed method of
combining off-line and on-line checking. The off-on-line scheme is implemented
through the deployment of a network of Anti Cheating Servers (ACS), which
replaces the central host in the previous models. In the payment phase, the shop
contacts an ACS to check the coins submitted by a customer. The ACS does not
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have the same power as the central host in the previous schemes (storing the whole
history database of spent coins) but it does have some regional information which can
be used to detect the repeated attempts to spend a coin in the region covered by that
ACS. We assume coins are classified into value-levels based on their values. We use
the term "value-level" to refer to these levels. For example, a coin of $200-$ 1000
corresponds to level 1 and a coin of $50-$ 199 corresponds to level 2 . According to
the value-level of the coins, more or less resources of the ACS network will be used
to check the coins, and hence with a proportional probability the double-spender is
caught in real-time. Checking tiny value coins, e. g. 1-10 cents, will take no resource
of ACS network as the shop does not contact any ACS and deposits the coins at the
end of day (as in the Chaum off-line model). Meanwhile checking big value coin,
such as a $1000 coin, will take maximum resources and the effect is equivalent to online checking in the on-line model.

The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we will introduce
the conceptual model of the proposed system and will provide some notations.
System specification will be given in the section after the next, with a numerical
example for illustration. Finally, we will evaluate the system and present the chapter's
conclusion.
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IIL2 CONCEPTUAL MODEL

IIL2.1 THE ANTI CHEATING

SERVER

In our system the bank does not rely on a single central host. Rather, the workload is
distributed among multiple Anti Cheating Servers (ACS), each of which is located in
a region, having connections to all the shops in that area. At each ACS, a blacklist of
multiple-spent coins is kept. Whenever a shop receives a coin from a customer, it
transfers the coin in real-time to the local ACS, which will check the coin against the
blacklist to find out if any other cheating has occurred. All the just-double-spent
coins will be discovered by Check-at-the-end-of-the-day

as in the Chaum off-line

model. Moreover, for very high value coins, the on-line checking is performed on the
whole database of spent coins instead of checking against the blacklist to stop any
double-spending of big value coins.

In general, the second time spending of the same coin may be successful but after
that, exchanging information among the ACSs will disclose the cheating and will
insert the coin into a blacklist, which is kept in all ACSs, ensuring that ftirther
attempts of a greedy cheater will be stopped!
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111.2.2

HIERARCHICAL

NETWORK OF

ACS

The network of ACS is organized as a hierarchy with multiple levels of ACS. The
lowest level includes all the ACS which have direct connection to the shops. These
ACS locations are at the lowest branches of the bank which are, say, of district level.
All the shops in the district are connected to the district ACS^^. The higher levels are
at state and the national levels, and at the very top level, is just the central host.

While the central host maintains a history database that stores all the spent coins of
the whole system life period, each ACS at lower level maintains a local database
which stores spent coins of the day and is reset to empty at the beginning of
everyday. The off-on-line principle is supported by the following points:
•

The micro coins are not submitted in real-time from the shops to the district ACS
(off-line submission).

•

Small value coins are submitted immediately (on-line) to the district ACS.

•

Higher value coins, are submitted to district ACS first, then if they are not found
in the blacklist, they are forwarded from the district ACS to the ACS at the
higher levels, depending on their value.

•

Biggest value coins can go as far as the top level ACS.

^^ The district

ACS denotes the ACS at the district level
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At each level, coins are checked against the coins submitted earlier in the day in the
region (district, state ...) corresponding to the level of that ACS. In this way, doublespending in the region of districts, state, ... will be detected and updated into the
blacklist. Now suppose a cheater has stolen a coin and wants to spend that coin many
times. If the value-level of the coin is such that it is stored at state level, she can
spend her coin at most twice in a state and then she has to travel to the next state for
the next spending of the coin, but of course this cheating will eventually be disclosed
by Check-at-the-end-of-the-day .
IIL2.3

USING HASH VALUE

The size of a coin in off-line schemes is usually not less than 100 bytes. This is not
only to protect against cryptanalysis, but also to allow storing information about the
user's identity inside the coin. The coin submission requires even more data because
it includes information produced in the challenge-response phase at the shop when
the customer goes through the payment process. We propose to transfer and
manipulate digital coins in foil and in compressed form both. This allows more
efficient storage and checking of the coins. We will use hash functions to produce
digests of coins. A hash function is a function that maps an arbitrary length sequence
to a fixed length sequence (usually a much shorter). The output of a hash ftinction, or
hash value, is similar to a fingerprint of the input and although takes much less space,
it can be used to represent the original string. A collision happens when the hash
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values of two different inputs are the same. For our purpose, a simple hash function
such as division hash, is sufficient.

The submitted coin is stored in full at the district ACS, where it is submitted by the
shop; after that it is hashed into a digest and then forwarded to a higher level ACS.
All the transfer and computations are performed on the hash values (of course, IDs
and tracing information will be added in transfer). At a high level ACS, if a collision
is found, to determine whether it is by accident or a true double-spending, the high
level ACS can ask the district ACS theftiUinformation.

Here is an example that illustrates the usefulness of using hash value. Codes of 8
bytes (or 64 bits) length can present

different numbers. Let say, a fixed coin

value (denomination) can not appear in the shopping over a city of millions people,
more than 1 million (<2^®) times in a day. The probability of at least one collision,
according to 'Birthday paradox', can be estimated as:

-k(k-l)
P(m,k) = l-e

_220(2^"-1)
=l-e
2x2^ < 1 - -

1 - 1 / ( 1 + 2"'^) <2"''

That is, 8 bytes for hash value provides enough protection against accidental
collision, while the size of e-coins is usually in hundreds of bytes.
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We note that the size of the hash value (output of the hash function) should be
different for different value-levels of coins. One can see that coins of different values
have different frequency of occurrence (and hence different probability of accidental
collision of hash value). The small value coins occur more often than the big value
coins. Consequently, the size of the hash value space for small value coins should be
larger than those for bigger value coins.
IIL2.4

DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS

The system can be seen as an extension of the Chaum model with the shop contacting
the local ACS in real time to have verification of a submitted coin. We will omit
details of the Chaum model such as how to blind a coin or how to withdraw a coin.
Instead, we concentrate on the architecture and the work of the network of ACS,
which is the new feature of the new framework and extends the original Chaum
model.
The ACS network can be seen as a tree of nodes consisting of ACS. The structure of
the network and relevant definitions are given below:
• The leaves of the tree are district ACS, which are located at the district branches
of the bank. All the shops in the district have a live connection to the
corresponding district ACS.
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•

The central host is located at the root of this tree network.

•

State AC5 is a non-leaf node of this tree network. I-ACS denotes an ACS at level
I.

•

NUM-LEVELS denotes the number of the levels of this tree. Obviously, NUMLEVELS is a key parameter of the system.

•

History database denotes the database managed by the central host and stores all
the coins spent during the lifetime of the system.

•

District database denotes a database managed by a district ACS, which stores all
the coins submitted during a day from all the shops having connection to that
district ACS.

•

Blacklist denotes the list of coins which have been detected as double-spent at a
certain time. Some double-spent coins may be found at a later time, for example,
small value coins that are double-spent only twice in two different states. These
coins will be eventually caught by Check-at-the-end-of-the-day . Each district
ACS has a copy of this blacklist and every time a new coin is detected as a black
coin it will be sent throughout all the district ACS to update their copies of the
blacklist.

•

Ancestor list of a district ACS denotes a list of ancestor nodes of that district
ACS. A node named A, is an ancestor of a node named B if cutting the tree at the
point just above node A results in a tree with A being the root and B still being an
internal node. Each district ACS keeps its own ancestor list.
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•

Corresponding to the tree structure of the network of ACS, the coin value also is
divided into many levels (coin value classification). The number of coin valuelevels is NUM-LEVELS + 1. The network of ACS can also be seen as a tree of
NUM-LEVELS + 1 levels, if shops are also counted as nodes of the network.

•

I-coin denotes a coin at level I. For example, 1 cent may be a (NUMLEVELS+l)-coin while $1000 may be a 1-coin. The level of a coin determines
the level of the ACS tree network to which the coin finally reaches during a
purchase.

•

Check-at-the-end-of-the-day^ denotes the checking process at off-peak time
when all the coins have been submitted to the central host and are checked
against the whole history database. Because of the coin value classification,
Check-at-the-end-of-the-day for different coin value levels is performed at
different time intervals (shorter intervals for higher value coin).

•

EndDayCheckTimingFrame[l.. NUM-LEVELS+1] is a system parameter which
denotes the list of the values of different end-of-day checking timers,
corresponding to coin levels from 1 to NUM-LEVELS+1.

•

Hash-Function-List[l..NUM-LEWELS+l]

is a system parameter. Hash-Function-

List [I] corresponds to the coin value level I

^^ The phrase 'end-of-day', is used to imply the off-peak time for periodically checking as is not
necessarily at the end of the day.
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Figure 7. The conceptual model

IIL3 THE SYSTEM

111.3.1 SPECIFICATION

Here we describe the algorithms which are used when:
a. The customer submits a coin (I-coui) to the shop.
Depending on the value level I, one of the following procedures will be performed:
a.l. Procedure for tiny value coins (J=NUM-LEVELS + 1)
a. 2. Procedure for smaU-medium value coins {NUM-LEVELS > I > HIGHLEVEL)
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HIGH-LEVEL is a system parameter, indicating the least level of coin value at
which a coin can be considered of high value.
a.3. Procedure for high value coins: HIGH-LEVEL > I >1
b. The Check-at-the-end-of-the-day is performed.

The following is the specification of these 4 procedures. The procedure for smallmedium value coins is presented first and then the others because they refer to the
former.
Each procedure iacludes a number of steps. Each step is described informally (by
natural language) and then more formally, using a pseudo-code style. In the pseudocode description we follow the common style in programming languages. For
example,

X-^Y: info

Message info is transferred from X to Y

i f , then, else, stop, for..

keywords

Open, Check, Store in.

commands

CANCEL, OK, NIL

defined constants

{text )

comment

INFO-REQUEST (coin-ID)

message INFO-REQUEST
coin-ID
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with

parameter

III.3.1.1 Procedure for small - medium value coins (A)
1. When the customer submits a coin to the shop, the shop starts a new
communication session with the district ACS and transfers the submitted coin to
that ACS.
C {The customer}
C^

S:cs

{ cs - coin submission = coin + customer's response to the shop's challenge }

S {The shop}
Open comm-session
{comm-session:

S^

a communication

session to DA}

DA: cs

2. The ACS checks the coin against the blacklist. If it finds that the coin is already in
the blacklist then it will alert the shop to cancel the purchase and catch the
cheater-customer. Otherwise the shop is allowed to proceed with the purchase.
{2.1.}
DA {district ACS}
Check{cs, blacklist)
If 'found' then
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DA ^ S: CANCEL
( message to cause the shop cancel the purchase}

Close comm-session
Stop
{2.2.}

Else
DA

S: OK

{ message to cause the shop accept the purchase}

Close comm-session
End-If
3. Depending on the coin value, a hash function is selected and the hash value of the
coin is produced. The ACS checks the coin against the district database. If
'found', the coin will be broadcast to every district ACS as a black coin and all
the district ACSs will update their blacklist copies. Otherwise, the submitted coin
is stored in the district database with the coin ID (coin ID can be generated by
using a counter, which increases by one every time a coin is submitted to the
district database) and the hash value.
DA
Hash = Hash-Function-List [Lgvg/0/(cs)]
Check (Hash(cs), DA-database)
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If 'found' then
DA ^ M DAs: IS-BLACKCOIN{cs)
Else
Store (coin ID, hash(cs), cs) in DA-database
End-If
4. If the coin is not of district level, an ancestor ACS at appropriate higher level
(state, nation ...) is determined, then the triple, coin hash value, coin ID and the
district ACS's ID, is forwarded to that ACS.
DA
higher-level = LevelOf(cs)
//higher-level=NUM-LEVELS then
Stop
End-If
SA = Ancestor-List [higher-level]
{ Ancestor-List[l..NUM-LEVELS]
Ancestor-List[l]

is the central host, Ancestor-List[NUM-LEVELS-l]

ACS, Ancestor-List[NUM-LEVELS]

DA

indicates the ancestors of the district
is the district ACS itself}

SA: forward-info = (hash value, coin ID, DA's ID)
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database,

is the father state

5. At that higher-level ACS, say the state ACS, the forwarded coin is checked
against the state database. If 'found' then the state ACS will ask the
corresponding district ACS for full information, which will determine whether
this is a true double-spent coin or not. If yes, alarms will be sent to every ACSs to
update their blacklists. Otherwise the state database is updated with the new
information.
5.1
SA {stateACS}
Check (hash(cs), SA-database)
If 'found' then
Extract DA's ID from

forward-info {of coUision-making
coins}

SA

DAI : INFO-REQUEST

{com-\^)

SA ^ DA2 : INFO-REQUEST {com-lT>)
{for information of colliding coins in full-form (ie. cs)}

DAI

SA : csl

DA2 -> SA : cs2
5.2

//'csl[coin]=cs2[coin] then
SA ^ AU DAs : IS-BLACKCOIN{csl)
Stop
End-If
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End-If
Store forward-info in DA-database
Stop.

III.3.1.2 Procedure For tiny value coins (B)
The shops do not transfer the tiny coins in real-time, but temporarily keeps them in
their own database. At Check-at-the-end-of-the-day , all shops transfer the coins to
their district ACSs, which are then forwarded to the central host.
C
C

S: cs

Check (cs, shop-database)
If 'found' then
S^C : CANCEL
Else
Store cs in shop-database
S^C : OK
End-If
Stop
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III.3.1.3 Procedure for big value coin (C)
The process is similar to the process for small-medium value coins, with the
following modifications.
1. Same as step 1 of Procedure for small-medium value coins, called Procedure A.
2. Same as step 2.1 of Procedure A.
3. Same as step 3 of Procedure A.
4. Same as step 4 of Procedure A.
5.
5.1 {Same as step 5.1 of Procedure A.}
SA {state ACS}
Check (hash(cs), SA-database)
If 'found' then
Extract DA's ID from forward-info {of collision-making
coins}
SA -> DAI : INFO-REQUEST {co'm-lD)
SA

DA2 : INFO-REQUEST

{for information of colliding coins in full-form (ie. cs)}

DAI ^ SA : csl
DA2 ^ SA : cs2
5.2. {different from step 5.2. of Procedure A}
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^ es 1 [coin] =cs2 [coin] then
SA ^ AU DAs : IS-BLACKCOIN(cs\)
SA

DA ^ S: CANCEL

DA : Close comm-session
Stop
End-If
End-If
Store forward-info in DA-database
SA

DA ^ S : OK

Close comm-session to S
Stop.

IIL3.1.4 Procedure for Check-at-the-end-of-day (D)
For level I of coin value, there is a corresponding I-timer for check-at-the-end-of-theday. These timers are common for all ACSs. When an I-timer strikes, all district
ACSs transfer the part of their district database that only includes I-coins to the
central host which accomplishes the Check-at-the-end-of-the-day for this level I of
coin value. After that, parts of the blacklist, which stores information about the Icoins and I-ACS databases can be reset to empty.
For all 1=1. NUM-LEVELS
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When timer(EndDayCheckTimingFrame[I]) strikes
All DAs

Central-Host : DA-database(I)

For All DA: DA-database(I) = NIL
For All DA: blacklist(I) = NIL
For All I-ACS : I-Database = NIL
End
End

For every shop, when timer of Check-at-the-end-of-the-day

for tiny value coins

strikes, the shops must transfer their database of tiny coins to the corresponding
district ACSs, which in turn forward the data to the central host.
For all S
When timer fEndDayCheckTimingFrame[A^t/M-L^V£:L5'+l]) strikes
S -> DA-> Central-Host: shop-database
shop-database = NIL
End
End

111,3.2

SYSTEM

PARAMETERS

The system has the following parameters:
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•

NUM-LEVELS, an integer, defining the number of levels of the coin value, the
number of levels of tree of ACSs and the number of hashing fiinctions employed
in the system. This is a key parameter determining the system scale and the
workload distribution.

•

HIGH-LEVEL, an integer, defining the separation between medium and high
value coin, allowing the high value coins to be treated differently: on-line
checking at the ACSs at the level corresponding to their value level.

•

LevelOfO, a function, which takes a coin value as input and returns the level of
that coin value as output; it determines the detailed ranges of coin value for each
level.

•

Hash-Function-List[l..NUM_LEVELS+l], an array, whose elements are hash
functions employed in the system and defines which hash function is coupled with
which level of coin value.

•

EndDayCheckTimingFrame[l.. NUM_LEVELS-hl], an array, whose elements
are check-at-the-end-of-day

timers for each coin level.

These system parameters together with the geographical distribution of ACSs are the
design decision to be made, determining the security and economy of the system.
ACSs should be distributed based on the population density, which is assumed to
determine the business activities. Given the geographical map of a country, the
population map,, and shopping statistics, one can decide how many levels (NUM-
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LEVELS) of coin values should be used and the detailed installation of the ACS
network can be worked out.

An important feature of the system is that a cheater who holds an I-coin must spend
that I-coin no more than twice in an I-region of an I-ACS, otherwise she would be
caught. So the cheater has to travel I-region by I-region to spend the coin. This leads
to the main design principle of ACS network: The average I-region should be
large enough to make the cost of traveling between two I-ACSs more than the benefit
of spending that I-coin two more times.

The employed hash ftinctions highly affect the economy of the system Hash fiinctions
must be chosen such that their output size satisfy the following condition: the
probability of two different coins, bearing the same value, and having the same hash
value be adequately small.

The parameter EndDayCheckTimingFrame also affects the economy of the system.
This parameter should be chosen considering the severity of the assumed loss for
each level of coin value. Small coins of say 5 cents can be delayed for quite long time,
say 2 weeks, while big coins of $1000 or more should be off-line checked more often
(say every 2 hour). We note that the occurrence frequency of the 5 cents coins is far
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greater

than

that

of

the

$1000

coin,

and

so

a

well-designed

EndDayCheckTimingFrame will produce a more economical solution.

111.3,3

EXAMPLE

A city has a population of 5 millions people. Assume there are 50,000 shops (high
bound), that is one shop for every one hundred people. Assume the shops are using
e-cash system. Further assume:
•

A coin size is 100 bytes.

•

A payment requires on average transfer of 5 coins to the central host (e.g. the
amount of $135.50 can be paid by 1 coin of $100 + 1 coin of $20 + 1 coin of $10
+ 1 coin of $5 + 1 coin of 50cents). This costs 500 bytes storage of data.

•

Each shop has on average 100 purchases/hour.

If this e-cash system is based on the on-line model, the storage of data sent to the
central host in one day is:
0.5 Kbytes * 100 (purchases) * 24 (hour) * 50,000 (shops) = 60 (Gb).
This is just for one day. After one year no single host can easily manage this database.

In our system, one can employ 50 district ACS, each of which working for one
thousand shops. Every day the amount of stored data in a district ACS is:
0.5 Kbytes * 100 (purchases) * 24 (hour) * 1,000 (shops) = 1.2 (Gb).
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This can be stored in a typical PC hard disk (the district database is reset to empty
after each day). The ACS can be just a normal PC. The hardware requirement is
trivial in here.
111.3.4 POSSIBLE ATTACKS

III.3.4.1 Organization cheating
The enemy can be a hostile organization or a well-organized group of vandals. The
enemy can deploy many agents in many different region, say states. Then after
successftiUy stealing some e-coins at the state level or lower, these e-coins can be
electronically sent to all the members of the group who will spend them just twice
and hence will not be caught. This attack is beyond the real-time defense of the
system and can be considered as a potential danger, although the cheating will be
eventually disclosed by the Check-at-the-end-of-the-day. However, to successfully
damage the system, the number of stolen coins must be very large (note that the very
high value coins are still safe because of on-line checking at the central database).
This can not be done just by some coins accidentally picked up, but requires
systematized robbery which will put the enemy into a risky situation with serious
penalty. Hence, this kind of attack would be very rare.
It is commonly admitted that perfectly secure systems only exist in theory. To obtain
a practical system one must sacrifice some of the security. The important point for
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the designer of a system is to design the system and its parameters such that it
effectively limits the risk on the participants' asset. In our case, the system parameter
EndDayCheckTimingFrame[L. NUM_LEVELS+1] should be chosen careiuUy to
limit the double spending of high value coins. Moreover, such parameter can be
dynamic: when a series of cheating is detected in certain regions, backup resource on
the ACS network can be used to get the EndDayCheckTimingFrame down in these
regions, say the coins at the state level be end-day checked every 2 hour instead
every 12 hour; hence the cheaters can be caught.

III.3.4.2 Common boundary effect
The advantage of the system can be directly seen from the off-on-line principle,
namely:
The amount of system resource used to check double-spending of a coin of a certain
value is proportional to the coin value.
This is achieved by the introduction of a hierarchy of ACS. However this hierarchy,
as shown above, causes a weakness in the system. A cheater who holds a stolen Icoin can spend it up to 2*N times (with a small traveling cost) around the common
boundary of N I-regions. If the knowledge of such black area is made public, the loss
could be even more severe.
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A possible solution to this problem is to require an I-ACS to transfer all its
information about a new submitted I-coin to its neighboring I-ACS.
IIL3.5

EXTENSION FOR SHOPPING OVER THE INTERNET

The framework can be easily implemented for ordinary shopping activities with the
customer coming to the shop and using some kind of electronic wallet to pay. The
electronic wallet can be a dumb-card ( like a prepaid phone card) or a sophisticated
smart-card with its own display and keyboard for protection against possible cheating
by the shopkeeper at the point-of-sale ([GSTY96]).
However, the framework can not be directly applied to shopping over the Internet. In
shopping over the Internet, the geographical factor becomes less important as the
customer can visit shops at any distance. The idea of the shop being tied to an ACS is
hence less effective, although in practice the shop delivers the goods on the next day
and after the Check-at-the-end-of-the-day that allows the shop to detect double-spent
coins and catch the cheater before the delivery. In the case of shopping over the
Internet, the ACS can be tied to the user through her long-term IP address. The idea
is drafted in the following.
An ACS is established for each Internet domain. When the customer visits a shop and
buys some goods or service, the shop will obtain the IP address of the machine which
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the customer is using to access the Internet^^. Using this IP address the shop can
learn the Internet domain to which the user machine belongs, and hence can contact
the right ACS which is tied to all the IP addresses of that domain. From now on, the
system is the same as for ordinary shopping. The network of ACS is built up
according to the domain structure of the Internet. For example, if the framework is
implemented in Australia, the central ACS wiU be ACS.au. A customer accessing the
Internet

at the domain cs.uow.edu.au,

will have her coins submitted to

ACS.cs.uow.edu.au, ACS.uow.edu.au, ACS.edu.au and ACS.au, depending on the
coin value. Consequently, the cheater who wants to multiply spend a stolen coin must
manage to obtain multiple Internet accounts belonging to different low-level domains.
The cheater can not avoid checking by high-level domain such as com.au, edu.au
which means the cheater can not double-spend high value coins. This clearly
reduces the chance of the cheater and the presumed loss of the issuer bank,
maintaining an acceptable level of risk.

///.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have proposed a framework for extending previous e-cash schemes achieving a
higher level of security against multiple-spending.

^^ The IP address of the sender machine is added in every IP packet by IP protocol to allow the
receiver machine to answer.
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The system has the basic structure of the old systems but includes, besides the 3
traditional entities, the user, the shop and the bank, a new entity - the ACS (Anti
Cheating Server). The complete set of protocols for withdrawal, payment and
deposit, is extended with the procedure for the shop contacting the local ACS.

The development of the ACS hierarchical network, the use of hash value and the
classification of coin values, result in strong and efficient protection against doublespending. A malicious attacker with even expert knowledge could not effectively
cheat in the new system The new system is also efficient from the point of view of
minimizing the workload. For example, a cheater has no way of double-spending a
$1000 coin but it is allowed to multiple-spend a coin of 50 cents at most twice in a
district. However in this case the traveling cost to other districts would be more than
50 cents and hence the attackers is effectively stopped The higher the value of the
coin is, the less is the probability of being minted and appearing in public. The higher
value coins result in more work in the system than the smaller value coins but they
appear less frequently.

Extending Chaum's off-line e-cash scheme using this framework will offer a high
level of security against multiple-spending which can even be compared to an on-line
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model. Meanwhile there is no need for special hardware and so the system is easier to
implement!

This framework can also be applied to the 'wallet with observer' model. This
provides an alternative for those who are using smart-card technology and now seek
higher security after recently announced attacks on smart-cards.

It is commonly believed that different e-cash schemes should be used for different
classes of coin values; that is, micro-payment for low value, off-line e-cash for middle
value and on-line e-cash for high value. This framework helps to optimize the coin
value denominations and allows enlargement of the range of coin values used in a
given system.
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IV. E-CASH WITH 'MIRROR WALLET

In this chapter, we propose a new architecture that is highly efficient and provides all
the desirable properties of an e-cash system such as revocable anonymity and loss
recovery. The proposal is based on mirror wallets that are network objects that store
customer's transactions and are transparent unless an illegal activity is committed by
a customer. The system allows a trade-off between customer privacy and legal
traceability and incorporates the notion of off-on-line, introduced in [NgRa97], to
achieve a trade-ojf between protection

against double-spending

and system

efficiency.

Our proposal is versatile

and provides features such as coin

divisibility,

overspending detection and electronic check. Finally, we consider, and succeed to
control the potential risk of trust abuse where an insider in the trusted third-party
(auditing server) is corrupted.
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IV. 1 THE BASIC MODEL WITH NEW NOTIONS
In non-anonymous e-cash systenis, a coin consists of a public part (p_coin) and a
secret part (s_com). The customer pays the shop by handing over p_coin and then
uses s_coin to generate the response to the shop's challenge. p_coin can be revealed
to public but only the customer can use it for payment because of the secret s_coin.
For anonymous e-cash, p_coin is also kept secret before the payment. By using blind
signature in withdrawal the bank can not learn p_coin.
We devise the notion of mirror wallet which is a database object storing values of
p_coin. Mirror wallets are created when customers start using the system (in the
Wallet Setup protocol) and are stored at a trusted third party called auditing server.
Two different wallet serial numbers (WSN), b_WSN and c_WSN, are generated by
the bank and the customer (user), respectively, to identify the wallet in
communicating with the auditing server. If the bank does not know c_WSN then it
can not trace the customer's payment.
The auditing server is involved in the withdrawal protocol, however, the involvement
is non-interactive and off-line. Having finished the normal withdrawal process, the
customer and the bank both send their withdrawal views to the auditing server
(including the blinding factor from the customer). This can be done off-line but
needed to be before the customer's spending of the coin. The auditing server will
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check the customer's report of withdrawal (p_com inside) against the bank's report
and if it does not match, alarm is sent to the bank with b_WSN to identify the
dishonest customer. Otherwise it stores the combined withdrawal report into the
corresponding mirror wallet.

During the payment, the customer sends the p_coin to the shop with c_WSN
encrypted with the auditing server's encryption key. After verifying the bank's
signature on the p_coin and the customer's knowledge of s_coin, the shop forwards
the payment view to the auditing server, who will check the coin against the blacklist
(list of black coins that are either double-spent or suspicious as originated from
criminals) and against the corresponding mirror wallet. We separate these two parts
of checking (by the shop and by the auditing server) and introduce an auditing phase
which can be dealt with separately. Then normal method of payment is off-line and
on-line payment is used (with auditing process done directly in real-time) only if the
shop is alarmed to do so (for tracing illegal coins).

Revoking anonymity is easily achieved in this model. We provide a coin tracing and
owner tracing protocol. Coin tracing is used against crimes such as blackmailing: the
blackmailed customer authorizes the bank to contact the auditing server and then get
all the un-spent coins from the mirror wallet. After checking against the deadline of
the blackmailed withdrawal, suspicious coins are blacklisted: the auditing server
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updates the blacklist and all the shops are alarmed to use on-line payment. Owner
tracing is used against crimes such as money laundering: The bank sends the
suspicious deposited coins to the auditing server that checks them against the mirror
wallet database. Once a mirror wallet is found matched, the corresponding b_WSN is
sent to the bank to identify the owner of suspicious coins.

The notion of auditing server with mirror wallet is similar to the notion of
ombudsman in [JaYu961 but is different and independent. The involvement of the
auditing server is non-interactive and off-line while the ombudsman takes an
interactive role in the withdrawal. Moreover withdrawal views from all customers are
unordered in the ombudsman's database, while are ordered by mirror wallets in the
auditing server's database and help to speed up the checking process and provides a
precious property: wallet loss recovery. The cost to be paid for all of this is stronger
trust on the auditing server, who will be able to have all the customer transactions
revealed if the bank, or the shop, accidentally or deliberately reveals the customer
name in even one transaction. However, as mentioned earlier, this is a starting model
which is furthered developed in the subsequent sections to reduce trust on the servers
and provide protection against collusion attacks.

/Ï/.2 THE SCHEME
In the following, we present a realization of the above model.
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IV.2.1

NOTATIONS,

MESSAGE FORMATS AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC

COMPONENTS

Players are denoted by C (customer, user), S (shop), B (bank), AuS (auditing server).
A message numbered i sent from Src to Dest in phase T is denoted by
m^ (Src, Dest). Phase T can be, W for withdrawal, P for payment, A for auditing or
D for deposit.
We often write the equations y = f ( x ) or y = f(x,p)

in another form

= {x}^ or y = [xY^ to emphasize on the data (messages x, y) rather than the
fiinction. Also 3; = {jcj^^ and y = {x}^, denote a message encrypted with the public
key and with the secret key of player A, respectively.

IV.2.1.1 Partial blinded signature scheme - How to date blind signature
As mentioned in chapter 2, a blind signature scheme consists of a 4-tuple of ftinctions
(Bl(m, p), Sig(m), UnBl{m, p), Ver{m, m'))
that satisfies
VMVp

Ver{mA{{m]';

= I.

Partial blind signature schemes, introduced in [AbFu96], is a special blind signature
scheme in which a part of the message is kept unprocessed during the blinding phase
and is readable by the

signer. This part of the message is usually some useful

common information such as time-stamp (in applications such as E-cash, it helps to
set up parameters such as coin expiration). The scheme guarantees that none of the
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parties (the user and the signer) can cheat by altering this common plaintext
information without being detected by the other. Accordingly, the 4-tuple of
functions is
(Bl(m, c, p), Sig(m, c), UnBl(m, p), Ver(m, c,m'))
which satisfies:
VMVcVp

}r) =l

with m is blinded part and c is the clear part (common information).
For the sake of brevity, we will refer to this component as [P-Blind Signature].
Example: [P-BUnd Signature] can be employed to realize the e-cash model with
multiple deposit servers in II.2.2, that is to bind a customer's (C) deposits to a
particular deposit server (D). This can be done by using [P-Blind Signature] in the
withdrawal protocol such that the c above consists of the identifier of the deposit
server D. Hence, in the payment phase the shop knowing c can deposit the e-coin to
D properly.

IV.2.1.2 Collaborative generation of a pseudo-random number
This problem is often stated as how two parties can collaborate in tossing a coin.
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A method for achieving this goal is to use Diffie-Helman key agreement protocol
with extension to protect against man-in-the-middle attack. We will refer to this
component as [Co-Tossing].

IV.2.1.3 Coin construction
The coin consists of 2 components: secret and public - denoted by s_coin and p_coin
respectively: coin = (s_coin, p_coin). The user presents p_coin to the shop and
proves to the shop (by challenge-response method) that she knows s_coin. This can
be done as follows:
+ The user has an RSA signature scheme with modulus

P and Q are large

primes and are kept secret.
+ The user generates a random number 5 such that gcd((P -1)(Q-1),^) = 1 and will
keep it as the secret s_coin. He then computes p as the public key corresponding to
the secret key s: p = F(s, p, q).
+ The user contacts the bank during the withdrawal phase and asks for the bank's
signature on p. Now p_coin is the signed p.
+ The shop challenges the user by sending a random number r. The user responds by
y=

which the shop can verify by using p in the p_coin.

Clearly the shop can not frame the user by forging the user's transactions because
only the user can generate the correct

for a randomly chosen 5 such that the pair (r,

y) can be verified by using p in the pjooin.
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We will refer to this component as [Coin-Construction].
IV,2,2

PROTOCOLS

We assume that the communication channels between any two parties are
authenticated and can not be eavesdropped. The bank has a digital signature scheme
with the key pair {K^.K^). The auditing server has a public-key encryption scheme
with the key pair

IV.2.2.1 Wallet Setup
1. C and B collaboratively generate a random r^ ([Co-tossing]) then each computes
bJWSN = f(<user_ID>,r^^

where/is a one-way collision- free hash

function.
2. B sends a request-to-open-new-mirror-wallet to AuS with b_WSN. AuS creates a
new mirror wallet m_wallet linked to b_WSN.
3. C contacts AuS and shows b_WSN. C and AuS collaboratively generate a random
r^ ([ Co-tossing]). Each computes c_WSN =

f(b_WSN,r^).

The Wallet Setup is finished with B end up knowing bJVSN linked to the customer
bank account. AuS knows the link {m_wallet, cJVSN, b_WSN) just for internal use
and knows nothing about the customer's real ID information. The customer knows
c_WSN to contact the auditing server later on.
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IV.2.2.2 Withdrawal
Withdrawal has two distinct stages. In stage A, the customer works with the bank to
generate a coin. In stage B, both the bank and the customer report their withdrawal
views to the auditing server who will verify and store the complete view into the
mirror wallet associated with the customer.

Stage A. Withdrawal of the coin:
In this stage the customer works with the bank to produce the coins.
1. C generates a unique random number 5 {s_coin) and computes p = {5}^ ^ ^ using
the function F introduced in [Coin-Construction].
C sends a request-to-withdraw message to the bank. The message consists of
<blinded-p>,

<common-information>,

<value-of-coin-to-withdraw>

and

<customer- ID>:
C ^ B : my{C,B) = (bld_p,

c_inf,

customer_ID)

c_inf = value\time_ stamp
with

P = {^}N,p,Q

Here p corresponds

to m and cjnf

corresponds to c in [P-Blind Signature],

respectively, p is the blinding factor.
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2. B receives m^ (C,B), debits the customer's account by the value, checks if cjnf
has been correctly constructed, then signs bid_p and sends the signed message to
C:
B^C:
with sig_bld_p=

{bld_p}'lfj'^

rn^(BX) = {sig_bld_p)
, K^ is the secret-key of the bank.

3. C receives m^ (C, B) and then un-blinds and verifies sigjbld

?

Verify {p, c_ inf, sig_ p) = 1
Now the customer has the coin = {s_coin, p_coin) = (s, p\ sig_p \ c_inj).

Stage B. Report to the auditing server
4. B sends its view of the withdrawal transaction to the AuS:
B-^AuS: rri^{B,AuS) =

{b_WSNMd_p,sig_bld_p,c_ini)

AuS finds m_wallet linked with b_WSN, then the triple {bld_p, sigjbld^,

cJnf) is

linked to m_wallet.
5. C sends AuS the p_coin and the blinding factor:
C-^AuS: m^(C,AuS)

= (c_WSN, p, sig_p, c_mi, p)

AuS finds m_wallet linked with c_WSN, verifies customer's report by checking
against bank's report:
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(c_inf)c=(c_inf)5

If any of the equations above is not satisfied, AuS will inform B who will work out
either:
+ that is a B's error (rarely) Or
+ C did not follow the protocol correctly
Otherwise, AuS stores {p, sig_p, c j n f ) into m_wallet.

IV.2.2.3 Payment
1. C pays S as follows:
C^S:

m[{C,S) = {p, sig_p, c_mf,

where enc_c_WSN = {cJWSN, r ] r

enc_c_WSN)

= random

Having c_inf, S checks if the coin has not expired yet (c_inf. time-stamp) and bears a
proper value(c_m/.vfl/w^). Then S verifies (p, sig_p)'.
?

{sig_p,pV'''

=l

2. S challenges C by sending a random r^ :
S ^ C : m'{SX)
3.

= rs

With the secret 5 (s_coin) C signs r^ and sends the result to S:
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4. S receives t= m^ (C, S) and verifies {i, r^ } = 1. If OK, then:
+ S continues the auditing protocol (presented next) if B has alerted it to do so (see
blacklisting protocol), and otherwise
+ S accepts the payment.
IV.2.2.4 Auditing
1. S sends the payment view to the AuS
S ^ AuS: m^{S,AuS) = {p, sig_p, c_inf, enc_c_WSN, r^ , 0
2. AuS extracts c_WSN\ c_WSN = {enc_c_WSN]

AuS maintains a blacklist

with items of format m^ (S,AuS). AuS extracts p and checks against the
blacklist, if 'found' then informs S to cancel the purchase and the required law
enforcement actions can take place; otherwise lets S accept the payment.
7

If Check {blacklist, p] = \ then
(ACS^S: CANCEL)
Else
ACS-^S:OK
End-If
3. AuS finds the m_wallet associated with c_WSN, then uses p for keying to check
against the coin against m_wallet. If the result is:
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+ 'not found' or 'found in the list of spent coins', then AuS informs B by giving it
b_WSN. B blacklists the coin and uses bJVSN to disclose the dishonest
customer's identity.
+Jound in the list of un-spent coins', then AuS marks it as spent coins with (r^ , t)
recorded for a proof of spending.
Note: AuS can periodically check and eliminate the expired coins from both lists of
spent and un-spent coins.
IV.2.2.5 Deposit
1. S redeems coins to B at off-peak time by sending payment views:
S->B: m^{S,B)= (p, sig_p, c_mf, enc_c_WSN, r^ , t)
2. B verifies the pairs {p, sig_p) and {r^ ,t) and credits S's account by the amount in
c_inf:

7
{sig_p,p}^'' = I

TV.2.2.6 Wallet loss recovery

If C looses his wallet, he can recover all the remaining coins in the wallet using the
following protocol.
1. C contacts B for loss recovery. B sends b_WSN to AuS
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2. AuS finds the m_wallet linked to bJWSN then sends the list of un-spent coins to
B:
AuS^B: {(p, sig^,

cjnflll,

Also AuS delete m_wallet in its database.
3. B verifies the pair (p, sig_p) and then credits back the corresponding amount to
C's account.
4. C goes through the Wallet Setup phase to rebuild the wallet.
IV.2.2.7 Blacklisting
1. B and AuS agree on a case to blacklist a suspicious or double-spent coin.
2. AuS updates the blacklist with that coin.
3. B alerts all S to do on-line auditing (connect to AuS to audit coins in real-time in
payment)
IV.2.2.8 Tracing coin
B sends b_WSN to A\xS.
AuS fmds the m_wallet linked to b_WSN and blacklists the list of un-spent coins.

IV.2.2.9 Tracing the owner
1. B sends AuS the deposit view of a suspicious coin
B->AuS: {p, sig_p, c_inf, enc_c_WSN, r^ , t)
2. AuS extracts c_WSN: c_WSN = {enc_c_WSN}
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AuS checks its store of links (m_wallet, c_WSN, b_WSN), if found sends bJVSN to
B.

3. B checks its customer account database and finds the one linked to the b_WSN.
IV,2.3

SECURITY

Here we state the main security features of the system and a brief justification of each
feature.
Given that an auditing server is trusted,
+ to always correctly follow the protocols,
+ not to reveal its database of mirror waUet to any other party unless required by the
law,
+ to cooperate with the bank in the lawful tracing suspicious cases and to recover
customer's wallet,
then the scheme achieves,
+ double-spending detection: the auditing server keeps withdrawal reports in mirror
wallets and marks a coin spent after the first spending;
+ framing-freeness: the shop can not frame the customer because it does not know
p_coin and so can not generate {r^ ,t)\
+ anonymity w. r. t. the bank: by using blind signature, the bank does not know
p_coin before payment;
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+ anonymity w. r. t. the auditing server as the auditing server knows only bJWSN and
c_WSN, pseudonyms of the customer;
+ unlinkability w. r. t. the bank: the bank does not know cJWSN, which is the only
key to link customer payment views together;
+ anonymity revocability: directly seen from the protocols; and
+ wallet loss recoverability: directly seen from the protocols.

IV.2.4

EFFICIENCY

+ Most previous e-cash proposals suffer from the problem that the bank has to
maintain a large database of deposited coins to be able to check double spending and
search through this database which is a time consuming task. In our scheme the time
to check a coin against such database is nearly zero because the database is
distributed among customer mirror wallets. This efficiency is equivalent to those in
[CPS94, LoMa94].
+ The involvement of the auditing server is non-interactive and it is off-line during
withdrawal and, off-line during payment if no suspicious case is reported. Overall, the
on-line processing in the system is minimal.
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V. EXTENDED

SCHEME

WITH

DISTRIBUTED

'MIRROR WALLETS' AND ANONYMOUS AUDITING
SERVERS

This chapter is the continuation of chapter 4. Here we consider the weaknesses of the
scheme presented in the previous chapter and develop an extended scheme to
overcome these weaknesses.
V . 1 THE EXTENDED MODEL

V. 1.1 DISTRIBUTED MODEL WITH ANONYMOUS

COMMUNICATION

In chapter 4 we showed that using mirror wallets is very helpful. However it
introduces some new problems. Firstly, it causes the linkability of the customer's
transaction w. r. t. the auditing server. That is all the customer's transactions can be
linked together through the mirror wallet. Therefore, if just one transaction is
disclosed with customer's name known to the auditing server then all other
transactions can be linked to that customer's name. An example situation is when a
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shop discloses the customer's name to a person who works at the auditing server.
Secondly, the auditing server becomes a very attractive target for banks, or other
attackers: an attacker who knows b_WSN or c_WSN of his enemy's wallet can break
into the auditing server and find the proper mirror wallet to trace his enemy's
business. Finally, we note a potential threat to the system when a staff is bribed to
sell auditing information to a bank or an attacker.

To prevent these potential weaknesses, we develop an extended model with multiple
auditing servers. At the WaUet Setup, an auditing server will be selected and
authorized to create and maintain the customer's mirror wallet. This selection is made
fair to both the customer and the bank, i.e., the selection is random to both sides, by
using the protocol in [Co-tossing]. Therefore, neither the customer nor the bank can
choose an auditing server at their advantage. It helps to protect the auditing server
against the customer's attempt to double-spend without being detected and against
the bank's to record all the customer's transactions.

We establish anonymous communication channels between the auditing server and
the other parties. This is achieved using intermediate servers called ACSs
(Anonymous Communication Server) and using aliases. The ACS officer who
establishes and maintains the ACSs, generates an encrypted list of network addresses
of all the auditing servers by using a secret key encryption scheme. This secret key
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encryption scheme is known to all the ACS. Bank, shops, customers communicates
with the auditing servers through the encrypted addresses in this list, used as aliases.
A message sent to an auditing server must pass through one of the ACS, who will
decrypt the alias address and forward the message to the destination auditing server.
Aliases (encrypted addresses) can be periodically changed by encrypting real
addresses with salt values that are changed. This will protect against gradual leaking
of addresses. If the number of auditing servers is large, it is practically impossible to
guess the true address of an auditing server from its alias.
([LoMa94] also proposed an electronic payment scheme that uses an intermediate
machine to provide anonymous channels.)

An important advantage of this distributed model is the distribution of trust and hence
lowering trust level on a single server. This makes the system more practical
compared to the basic model.
In the new model, the database at an auditing server is only a small part of that used
in the basic model. This has two advantages. Firstly, the risk to selling auditing
information by a staff member is reduced. In the new model, he can not find out who
likes to buy this auditing information. Secondly, if an auditing server is compromised,
only a small part of the customer population is put at risk of loosing their privacy.
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A distributed model does not only help to improve system robustness but also
scalability. In the basic model, when the customer population grows, the auditing
server becomes a bottleneck flooded with huge flow of transactions. In distributed
model, one can set an upper bound on the number of customers per auditing server
and introduce new auditing server when the number of customers passes that bound.

V.1.2

A CONTINUUM BETWEEN ON-LINE AND OFF-LINE PA YMENT

Most existing anonymous e-cash systems are on-line systems while the more
advanced model - off-line e-cash - is also extensively studied (chapter II). Compared
to off-line payment that relies on detecting the double-spender after the fact, on-line
payment provides a prior restraint against double-spending. In the former the realtime checking process effectively stops cheating attempts, while in the latter the delay
window in checking process could let the cheater to make many purchases with the
same e-coin. The cheater may have stolen the e-coin from another customer, in which
case the bank will catch the honest customer! Using this method a collaborative
group of cheaters may succeed in hundreds of purchases in a single day. We call this
attack a MMS (mega-multiple-spending) attack. One may argue that off-line e-cash
systems should not be used for high value purchases. Such purchases must be
reserved for on-line systems. However if a MMS attack is launched, the loss would
not be easy to tolerate.
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'Wallet with embedded observer' is an innovative off-line paradigm in that one
manages to achieve a mechanism for prior restraint against double-spending with the
embedded observer device acting as an electronic guardian ([ChPe92, Bra93b,
CAFE94, Fe94]). Nevertheless, this mechanism is not perfectly immune to doublespending attacks because breaking such tamper-resistant device is just a matter of
cost and time. Especially, given that the compromised wallet is full of coins, an MMS
attack can really damaging.

Bypassing tamper-resistance combined with MMS produces a very strong attack that
although hard to implement but not impossible. Here we give a solution to this
problem in the extended model. In chapter 3, we proposed the off-on-line approach
that effectively combines the security of on-line and efficiency of off-line systems.
The basic idea is to provide different types of processing for different coins based on
their value. In the rest of this section we will show how to incorporate this feature
into the model described in the earlier sections.

In our proposed solution, we provide smooth change between the processing for
different grades of coin value. In other words, we achieve a continuum between online and off-line payment.
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(1) Firstly, we distinguish three stages of checking process of coins:
A. Verifying the bank signature on the coin (p_coin) and verifying the knowledge of
the customer about s_coin.
B. Checking the coin against the blacklist of double-spent coins and suspicious
coins.
C. Checking the coin against the mirror wallet.
(2) Secondly, we let the ACS take part in the process of checking. Recall that in the
basic model, stage A is performed in payment phase, processed by the shop, while
stages B and C are in the auditing phase, processed by the auditing server. Here,
stage B is separated from auditing and processed by the ACS. The blacklist is stored
at ACSs instead of the auditing servers. Therefore, the three stages A, B & C are
processed at separate places (shop, ACS and auditing server respectively).
(3) Thirdly, we establish a set of rules to provide a continuum of checking between
on-line and off-line payment, based on the principle that "the higher value coin
must have less delay in going through stages B and C (if it has passed the earlier
stage)":
+ For small value coins (say < $1) only stage A in real-time (B,C is off-line)
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+ Middle value coins (say > $1) have stages A and B in real-time (C is off-line), that
is the shop contacting an ACS in real-time at payment to check coins against the
blacklist.
+ High value coins (say > $100) have all the checking stages (A, B, C) in real-time.
That is after the ACS checks a coin against the blacklist, it immediately contacts the
auditing server for checking against the corresponding mirror wallet. All these 3
stages are made on-line before letting the shop accept the payment.
-I- The delays between stages A and B (if B is made off-line) and between stages B
and C (if C is made off-line) are inversely proportional to the coin value. For
example, coins of values between $1 and $99 are all processed on-line in stages A
and B, and off-line in stage C. However, the delay between payment and auditing
(phase C) are varied, say 5 minutes for $20 coins but 2 minutes for $50 coins.

This mechanism achieves an ideal trade-off between the efficiency and security:
+ The low value purchases are more frequent than high value purchases and in the
proposed system require a higher degree of checking (towards the off-line extreme
on the continuum introduced above). This results in a very economical system.
+ The MMS attack is restrained and the loss, if attack coccurs, is controllable: the
more valuable coins are checked quicker in stages B and C and therefore if the
attacker wants to deploy MMS with high value coins he has very little time to
succeed, and he is forced to use low value coins if he wants longer period.
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(4) Finally, there is a specific local ACS for each small location (small town, district,
suburb) where every shop in the area maintains a live communication with it. Each
ACS has live channels to all the auditing servers. There is an upper bound on the
number of live connections with shops per ACS. Whenever the shopping in an area
grows, new ACS are introduced to avoid a bottleneck in the system. This results in
that the ACSs are always available for communications of various types discussed in
(3).

Generally, the ACS has two roles:
+ to be the intermediate machine to anonymize the auditing servers.
+ to maintain the blacklist and check against this blacklist with coins submitted from
the shop. Often, this checking is on-line as for coins of not very low value, but this is
affordable due to the limited scope of the trading in a small local area around the
ACS. Besides, the work of auditing server is to discover illegal coins and, if found,
alarm all the ACSs to update the blacklist. In short, the work of ACSs and auditing
severs combined replaces the work of the auditing server in the basic model and the
alarm channels between banks and shops are no longer needed.
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Because of this dual role, ACS can stand in two ways: for Anonymous
Communication Server and for Anti Criminal Server (an incredibly nice
coincidence!).
V.2

THE EXTENDED SCHEME

V.2.1

NEW SCENARIO WITH EXTENDED FEATURES

The system consists of Customers (C), Shops (S), Banks (B), ACSs and auditing
servers (AuS). There are two trusted parties:
+ the judge who enforces the law and sends the instructions or court orders to revoke
anonymity of illegal transactions and, who settle cases of complaints and disputes
between players.
+ the ACS officer who sets up and controls the ACS servers.
The ACS officer establishes local ACS servers in each small area. Auditing servers
are trusted softwares that are installed by the ACS officer at locations approved by
ACS officer. The number of auditing servers should be large to minimize the risk and
loss incurred if an auditing database is compromised. Auditing servers are hidden
from banks, shops and customers by the method mentioned earlier with the help of
ACS.
Extending the protocols in the basic scheme to the distributed case, we have:
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(1) In wallet setup, an anonymous auditing server is chosen to audit the customer's
transaction transactions. The customer can authorize the ACS officer to make
the selection for him otherwise (for VIP customers who are more sensible with
privacy) a fair selection can be made by collaboration of the customer and the
bank (based on [Co-tossing]).
(2) In withdrawal and payment phase, the bank, the customer and the shop
communicate with the corresponding auditing server through local ACS using an
alias (as the AuS address encrypted by the ACS key).
(3) The payment and auditing phases follow the rules of the continuum of on-line &
off-line introduced in section V.1.2, with checking against blacklist at the local
ACS.
(4) In coin tracing and owner tracing protocols, the bank cooperates with the
auditing server as in the basic scheme, except that the bank has to contact the
ACS officer beforehand to show the court order.
(5) Blacklisting is done by the auditing server by alarming all the ACS to update the
blacklist with double-spent coins, or coins, that are traced by the court orders (in
cases of blackmailing or bank robbery)
In the following we will present the new features of the extended scheme.
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V.2.2 WALLET SETUP

Customer (C)

Bank (B)

Randomly choosing AA^ = \addr_ A5. j
^

' ^ACS

ACS officer

in one of the two ways:
V MaxNoAuS

The ACS officer randomly chooses an item (AA^) in the list faddr_ AuS. |
The customer and the bank collaboratively and randomly choose AA^in the above list.

C

Auditing server
(AuS)

B

Collaboratively generate a random number r^
([Tossing coin])
b_WSN =
/(< user_ID >,r, )

b_WSN =
/(< user_ID )

request
b WSN

request, b_WSN
Collaboratively generate a random number r^
([Tossing coin])
<
>
c_WSN =

c_WSN = f[<

f[<b_WSN,t
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b_WSN,r

V.2.3

WITHDRAWAL

Customer (C)
c_inf = AA^\value\time_
bid _p = {/?}

Bank (B)

stamp

Auditing server (AuS)

; p: random

{bld_ p, c_ inf. Customer _ ID, amount)

sig_bld_p

=

("''-/'lit.,.

n^{B,C) = sig_bld_p
I UnBl
?

Verify{p, c_ inf, sig_ p) = 1
coin = (s, p\ sig_p \ c_inf)

t =t+

(reporting to AuS can be done off-line)
{b_WSN,bld_p,
sig_bld_p,c_\ni)

m^(B,AuS)

>

m'^iC, AuS) =
(c_ WSN, p, sig_ p, c_

inf, p)

m!'(C,AuS)

(c_inf)c=(c_inf)5

Store

and
receipt

= [m'^

{C,AuS)rif:
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(p,sig_p,c_inf)
(b_WSN,c_WSN)

V.2.5

AUDITING

ACS
<address of AuS> = [AAr}
c_WSN = {enc_c_WSN}
m^(ACS,AuS)

Auditing Server (AuS)

,
^ACS

=

{p,sig_p,c_'mi,c_WSN,t)
m,\ACS,AuS)
m-wallet =Find(database, c_WSN)
Verify(m_wallet, p, UNSPENT) = 1
to-blacklist

V.2.6

ROBUSTNESS

AGAINST THE MMS

ATTACK

Theorem 1. If all other parties follow the protocols correctly then the cheating
customer can not multiple-spend more than

times with a particular coin or

she will be caught. L^^spend is a controllable threshold.
Proof.
Let X denote the coin value of a coin. t^cs-^AcsM denotes the delay between the
time an ACS receives a coin of value x , and the time it sends this coin to the proper
AuS for auditing, t^^^ = t^^^ M

denotes the time delay between an AuS receives a

coin and the time it really audits this coin. TJ,;^^ denotes the maximum time that it
may take to blacklist a coin when an AuS discovers a black coin. Let
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denote

the minimum time between two consecutive double-spending tries with a particular
coin.

After the cheater spends this coin the first time, t = i^cs+^Aw^' the coin will be
marked spent in the corresponding mirror wallet. After the cheater spends the coin
for the second time, at i = r^^^ + ^AUS ^^^^ of time later the corresponding AuS will
discover that the coin has been already spent and blacklist the coin. Then at
t (= tj^cs + ^Aus + ^biack) u^^ts of time after the second attempt, the coin is blacklisted
and from that time on any further attempt will cause the cheater to be caught. We
and adding one is to include the first
attempt that is truly accepted).

There must exist a constant

that is the lower bound for

, because it

always takes some time to travel between shops, selecting the goods, queuing and
processing transaction. Because of all of that

is controllable: it can be made

as small as required by designing proper t^CS ' ^AUS ' which depend on the resource
supplied for the ACS service (the number of ACS and AuS, speed of each machine,
bandwidth of the network communication, etc.).
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Of course

depends on xas weU as t^^^ and

when X is large enough, then t^^s = hus

Assume T , , ^ , «

(online auditing) and no double-spending

can be made successfully.

V.2,7

CUSTOMER

COMPLAINTS

Theorem 2. If all the authorized parties and the shop correctly follow the protocols,
then customer complaints for being wrongly blacklisted are always solvable.
Proof.

There are only two situations that the customer coins can be blacklisted ( apart from
the cases of criminals in which the bank and the ACS officer have a court order to do
so):

1. The customer double-spent a coin and the auditing server blacklisted it: in this
case we note that

the auditing server only blacklisted the coin when it had

received the two messages

m^ (ACS, AuS) = (p,sig_ p, c_ inf,c_ WSN, r^ ,t)

with the same p and different pairs of

. Given this information, the judge

can always tell that the customer is lying because only the customer could
produce such pair {r^^t). If the ACS officer blacklisted the coin it must have
kept this proof, otherwise the customer wins the case and the ACS officer has to
pay for that.
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2. The customer had not followed the step 5 in the withdrawal protocol, namely
reporting the withdrawal view to the auditing server, and then the auditing server
blacklisted the coin (after the customer payment) as it did not find the coin in the
corresponding mirror wallet. If the customer can show that she had really
followed the step 5 in the withdrawal protocol by showing the receipt as an ACS
signature on

Q then the judge regards the customer as innocent,

otherwise the case is clearly that the customer tells lie.

V.3 SECURITY & EFFICIENCY
The extended system achieves all the security properties of the basic system in
section V.2.3. Moreover, it effectively improves the system robustness:
+ The distributed nature and the mechanism for anonymous communication helps to
control the risk of a trusted party being attacked from inside. In the basic system, it
would be a disaster if an expert staff in the auditing server is corrupted, while the loss
in the distributed system is smaU.
+ The MMS attack is no longer a threat. The loss from this attack can be controlled.
The efficiency is improved:
+ The system achieves a trade-off between security and economy as discussed in the
section V.1.2.
+ Computation time is effectively reduced due to the distributed nature of the
auditing servers.
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+ The alarm channels between banks and shops (costly for shops) are no longer used.

V.4 CONCLUDING

REMARKS

A new architecture for electronic-cash systems is introduced that provides a new kind
of trade-off between customer privacy and legal traceability. Customer transactions
are stored in a network object, the so called mirror wallet, which is hidden from all
other parties unless an illegal activity is committed by the customer. The notion of
mirror wallet also helps to provide the property of waUet loss recoverability.

Another trade-off is between preventing double-spending (MMS attack) and system
efficiency by combining on-line and off-line payment ([NgRa97]).

The architecture is versatile. Functionality can be extended to include coindivisibility, overspending detection, electronic check, multi-currency support, etc.,
when applying the method mentioned in 2.1.7.

The high performance of the system is due to the combined techniques from the field
of cryptography and distributed system (e.g. the organization of the network of ACSs
and auditing servers). This can be seen as the unique feature of our work compared
to the other previous works in e-cash.
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This combination allows us to obtain the desirable e-cash properties but avoid the
highly difficult and complex mathematical systems, such as the well-known work of
Brands' based on the presentation problem (see [Bra93]).

Providing legal traceability through auditing server is similar to the notion of
ombudsman in [JaYu96, JaYu97b] or the blinding office in [M'Ra96]. However our
proposal does not suffer the interactive and on-line involvement of the trusted thirdparty in withdrawal phase . Moreover, we have also considered and succeeded to
control, the potential risk of trust abuse: collusion attack when an insider in the
trusted third-party (auditing server, ombudsman) is corrupted. Another advantage is
that the checking phase at the auditing server is much faster than that of ombudsman
in [JaYu96] by using mirror wallets.
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VL CONCLUSION

This thesis deals with the topic of analyzing and designing electronic cash systems.
We study this on the background of applied cryptography and distributed systems. In
e-cash systems, to achieve properties such as anonymity and off-line payment, strong
cryptographic protocols are used. However, deployment of the participants in e-cash
systems, their functionality and the flows of data between them, are aspects of
distributed systems. Combining the two viewpoints helps us to come up with some
new results.

Our main focus has been in decentralizing the process of checking coins, which is
usually handled by the bank host only. Our solution is to distribute the check process
and the data storage among a number of intermediate servers added into the system.

In the e-cash framework provided in chapter 3, a hierarchical network of AntiCheating Servers (ACS) is introduced, which allows distributing the checking
workload. The denomination of e-coins together with the differential on-line e-coins
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checking helps us to optimize the system efficiency, achieving a continuum between
on-line and off-line payment.

The idea of distributing is exploited much further in chapters 4 & 5 with the
introduction of the notions of mirror wallets and auditing servers. The checked space
reduces from the whole database of coins ever produced to a small part of it which is
anonymously linked to a specific user. Obviously, this strongly reduces the
computation workload of the system. The extended scheme in chapter 5 also
provides many useful functions that are tracing coins or owner and wallet loss
recovery.

Studying the active field of e-cash systems is hard but joyful. The distributed systems
idea has directed us to new e-cash schemes based on new extended models, using a
number of different existing cryptographic tools. We hope to be able to further
extend these ideas in future.
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